Conventional Wisdom
Most of the suffering in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina resulted from the arrogance and incompetence of FEMA and the Bush Administration.
Facts
Hurricane Katrina was a horrific disaster for the city of New Orleans and the U.S. Gulf Coast. Lengthy accounts of all that happened during those dreadful days and weeks, both good and bad, have been reported in meticulous detail, not only in the major media, but in several books published in 2006 and 2007. Here's a summary of the major events:
Katrina strengthened in the Gulf of Mexico to an ominous Category 5 hurricane with sustained winds of 175 miles per hour and gusts up to 200 miles per hour before making landfall as a Category 3 storm on the morning of August 29, 2005. In the coming days, many would lose their lives as a result of the storm. Amazingly, despite the widespread destruction of offshore Oil and Gas platforms, technology prevented any spills.
The first levees were breached by the pounding surf on Sunday. Then, on Monday morning, Katrina made landfall. By Wednesday, 80% of the city was under water. Everything not nailed down was swept away. According to one report from the National Association of Counties, St. Bernard Parish had a pre-storm population of 65,554. A year later, no more than 6,000 people were still living there.
"When Katrina first came ashore, it came ashore in Plaquemines," said the Parish President. "What the wind didn't get, the water did." 72 The small town of Empire was literally erased from the map. Roughly 60% of the 29,969 residents of the parish were finally able to return home by mid-2007. Both St. Bernard and Plaquemines Counties, which are part of the Greater New Orleans metropolitan area, where shattered by the hurricane.
The infrastructure of New Orleans and more than a dozen surrounding communities was utterly devastated. Stores, shops, and office buildings were swamped, and more than 142,000 homes and apartments were destroyed. As late as February 20, 2006, six months after the initial devastation, electricity was still being restored to the narrow peninsula where most of Louisiana's oil and gas industry was located.
As tragic as that hurricane was, the most serious catastrophe wasn't the storm itself. Of course the winds, rain, and flooding that pounded a major American city were disastrous, but Katrina was a bad hurricane like others FEMA had handled with remarkable success over the previous three years. But the levees were the real problem, and that's a story with a long and sad history.
When the levees broke, the potential for a full-scale humanitarian disaster increased many fold. The American Red Cross, which received its share of criticism by the media after the event, said that Katrina was the biggest relief effort they had ever encountered, by a factor of 20. After the storm, FEMA and Bush administration officials were severely criticized for not responding quickly enough and many people came to believe that the rescue effort was a major fiasco. If you happen to be one of them, here are some facts you may not be aware of:
- By Monday, August 29th, the day Katrina made landfall, 65 National Guard helicopters were positioned throughout the Gulf Coast region. Pilots were on 24-hour alert.
- Helicopter rescue missions began 4 hours after landfall, even before the winds subsided. Coast Guard teams alone rescued over 33,000 people, six times the Coast Guard's annual average nationally.
- Local organizations, such as Wildlife and Fisheries officers, rescued another 10,000 people with a force of 200 rescuers using boats and safety gear.
- 6,000 National Guard troops were called up from the affected states by Monday morning. 8,000 were on call by Tuesday. By Thursday, nearly 22,000 National Guard soldiers and airmen had been deployed to the region, including 6,500 in New Orleans alone, setting an all-time record for the largest ever response to a domestic emergency. 73
- 25 of FEMA's 28 national Urban and Rescue Incident Support Teams were deployed to the Gulf Coast to support the Katrina relief effort.74
At about noon on Tuesday, it became apparent that the levees could not be saved--even with massive 3,000-pound sandbags being dropped by helicopters. It was at that moment, and not before, that Katrina became much more than a bad hurricane. Three others had already hit either Florida or Louisiana that year without this level of devastation. That afternoon Louisiana governor Kathleen Blanco decided to evacuate the Superdome. Within one hour of the decision, FEMA tasked the U.S. Dept of Transportation with assembling a fleet of over 1,100 vehicles--while the city's perfectly fine buses sat unused as the water rose. Significant numbers of federally contracted buses began arriving at the Superdome on Wednesday afternoon, and carried thousands of evacuees to the Houston Astrodome. By Friday morning, approximately 15,000 people had been evacuated from the Superdome, leaving approximately 5,500. The evacuation was finished before dawn Saturday morning, September 3rd.
A Prophetic Warning
In 2004, several months before the actual disaster, 270 officials from all levels of government participated in a FEMA funded, week-long simulation of a severe hurricane hitting New Orleans. During this exercise, New Orleans officials were told that "the number of people stranded in toxic water may approach 500,000 if residents didn't properly evacuate." When Katrina hit one year later, the truth of that prophetic warning struck home.
The placement of food, water, and ice in advance of Katrina was the largest pre-positioning of federal emergency provisions in U.S. history. Katrina first made landfall in Florida as a Category 1 hurricane, and didn't come ashore in Louisiana until four days later. In preparation for the Florida landfall, FEMA had pre-staged 100 truckloads of ice, 35 truckloads of food, and seventy truckloads of water.
Then, anticipating a potential second landfall at some point further along the coast, FEMA also pre-staged over 400 truckloads of ice, 500 truckloads of water, and nearly 200 truckloads of pre-packaged meals (MREs) at logistics centers in Alabama, Louisiana, Georgia, Texas, and South Carolina.
Necessities On-Hand Pre-Landfall
The pre-landfall supply of food, water, and ice included 216 trailers with 1,026,432 gallons (3,888,000 liters) of drinking water, 439 trailers with 17,560,000 pounds of ice, and 180 trailers with 3,939,840 Meals Ready to Eat (MREs). FEMA began daily noontime video conference calls on Thursday, August 25 (four days before landfall), which included all federal, state, and local first-responders, to help inform and synchronize the anticipated relief efforts.
As soon as National Hurricane Center storm watchers recognized that Katrina's path was becoming more predictable than usual, NHC Director Max Mayfield issued the most severely worded warning he had ever given in a federal storm warning advisory. The message said75:
On Saturday, FEMA's Region IV and VI headquarters in Atlanta and Denton, Texas, respectively, commenced "Level 1 Operations," requiring full-staffing around the clock, seven days a week. FEMA Region VI dispatched its Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) detachment to Camp Beauregard, Louisiana, and requested the deployment of another MERS unit all the way from Denver to Denton, Texas, to serve as backup. On Saturday afternoon, shelters began opening throughout the region, and state emergency management agencies began deploying FEMA supplies to them, including the New Orleans Superdome. At Camp Beauregard, Region VI had staged 270,000 liters of water (71,280 gallons), 680,000 pounds of ice, 15,120 tarps, and 328,320 MREs. By 5:00 p.m., the quantity of water stored at Camp Beauregard had doubled to 140,000 gallons. Also on Saturday, FEMA began activating the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs), and Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) teams.
On the evening of Saturday, President Bush signed a Federal Emergency Declaration for the state of Louisiana, in response to the official request by Governor Blanco. On Sunday, he signed similar emergency declarations for Mississippi and Alabama. The issuance of a presidential emergency declaration before landfall is extremely rare; it has only been done once since 1990. By signing these declarations, the president not only signaled the extreme urgency, he directed the federal government to provide full assistance to the residents of the stricken area to save lives and property--in advance.
In another unprecedented move, the director of the National Hurricane Center called Governor Blanco to make a personal plea that residents be warned and evacuated. This was the only time he had made such a call in his 36 year career.
Closing Saturday's noontime video teleconference with his regional staff and the State EOCs, FEMA director Michael Brown urged all attendees to put forth an extra effort with unusually strong language:
"I know I'm preaching to the choir on this one, but I've learned over the past four and a half, five years, to go with my gut on a lot of things, and I've got to tell you my gut hurts with this one. It hurts. ... So we need to take this one very, very seriously. ... I want you guys to lean forward as far as possible. ... Why is this important? Because I worry about the people in New Orleans, Louisiana, and Mississippi right now, and they're going to need our help.... "
The first Emergency Response Team leader arrived in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on Saturday evening. On Sunday morning, 3 FEMA State Liaison Officers were deployed to the three gulf coast states. Also, early on Sunday morning, President Bush called Governor Blanco to urge that mandatory evacuation orders be issued for New Orleans, again signaling an unusual sense of urgency--he was on vacation at the time. After that call, Mayor Ray Nagin and Governor Blanco held a press conference during which the Mayor ordered a mandatory evacuation.
At noon on Sunday, the President participated in the FEMA conference call with Michael Brown and NHC Director Max Mayfield, and personally encouraged state and local officials to use precaution and get the word out to their citizens. He offered the full support and resources of the federal government. Then after the noon conference, the President issued a nationally covered public statement saying, "We cannot stress enough the danger this hurricane poses to Gulf Coast communities. I urge all citizens to put their own safety and the safety of their families first by moving to safe ground."
It was not until after the call from President Bush on Sunday that Mayor Nagin decided to order a mandatory evacuation. However, the buses designated for the purpose sat idle while the punch bowl that was New Orleans filled up with water. Ironically, the shrillest complaints about FEMA's response later on were that not enough buses arrived fast enough.76
By Sunday evening thousands of people were streaming into 114 shelters with space and supplies for over 28,000 people. Federal, state and local governments had worked with the Red Cross and other non-profit organizations to make these preparations. The Superdome, which was originally intended to shelter only the special needs population (elderly, sick, immobile), was unfortunately changed to a "shelter of last resort" for the general population, and later became a free-for-all when Mayor Nagin asserted in a press conference that the Superdome could accommodate 50,000 to 70,000 people.
The Louisiana National Guard had pre-positioned about 10,000 MREs (meals) and over 13,000 bottles of water at the Superdome. At noon on Sunday, as Katrina approached, officials requested an additional 180,000 liters (47,520 gallons) of water and 109,000 meals for the Superdome. Amazingly, FEMA was able to distribute an additional 90,000 liters of water and 43,000 meals before high winds forced the trucks to turn back.
In addition to stocking the Superdome, the Louisiana National Guard sent additional personnel to the Superdome throughout the day on Sunday. A 46-member Special Reaction Team--a unit "highly trained in law enforcement missions"--arrived at 7 a.m. on Sunday morning. By 3 p.m., the 527th Ready Reaction Force had arrived with 220 crowd control personnel. The 225th Engineering Group joined that evening with 220 soldiers to "assist with security." Another 100 personnel from the 159th Fighter Wing also came to assist with security. Additional medical personnel from the National Guard also arrived to assist at the Superdome. Five physicians, 4 nurses, 20 medics, and 6 Managed Care Organizations (MCOs) were added to supplement those already in place. Altogether, 71 medical personnel were on hand by the time the hurricane struck.
"If anyone rioted, it was the media." -- From the Bipartisan Report
By Thursday morning, conditions in the Superdome were atrocious. It was sheltering a population many times what was intended and as a result restroom facilities were inadequate. The unlucky souls who found themselves in those conditions wanted out and, as one would expect, lines started to form as soon as word got around that buses were coming to take them away to somewhere safer and less uncomfortable.
With nothing to do but stand and wait in long lines, it is easy to understand why false rumors spread about the imminent arrival of more buses. For hours on end the unfulfilled expectations added to the frustration and the seeming incompetence of those who had supposedly promised them. These rumors, and similarly false ones about rapes in the Superdome and unbridled killing in the city, were seized upon by the media as evidence of wanton chaos. Thus began the unfortunate blame game.
Reports in the press claimed that as many as 100 had died in the Superdome, mostly from heat exhaustion. Another report held that an accused rapist had been beaten to death by a crowd. The actual death toll in the Superdome was six--four from natural causes, one overdose, and an apparent suicide.77
The media's role in the Katrina disaster hasn't been overlooked entirely. A bipartisan congressional report released in February 2006 accuses the media of making a bad situation worse. In their investigation of FEMA's preparations for and responses to Hurricane Katrina, researchers found that the media's claims that gunshots had been fired at rescue helicopters were false. And the sensational reports of rioting in the streets were, if not false, unsubstantiated and overstated. Unfortunately, as a result of these reports, relief personnel from the Red Cross and federal troops were given orders not to go into areas that were perceived as dangerous--where the need for help was so great.
In their final assessment of issues reported by the media that stirred millions of Americans to fear, shock, and outrage during those long and troublesome weeks, they concluded by saying, "Clear accurate reporting was among Katrina's many victims. If anyone rioted, it was the media."
Insert Table 13_C (FEMA Disaster Response)| FEMA Disaster Response (1st Qtr. 2008) | |
| State | Disaster Type |
| Arkansas | Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding |
| Georgia | Severe Storms and Tornadoes |
| Missouri | Severe Storms and Flooding |
| Missouri | Severe Winter Storms and Flooding |
| Illinois | Severe Storms and Flooding |
| Kentucky | Severe Storms, Tornadoes, Straight-line Winds, and Flooding |
| Tennessee | Severe Storms, Tornadoes, Straight-line Winds, and Flooding |
| Arkansas | Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding |
| Hawaii | Severe Storms, High Surf, Flooding, and Mudslides |
| Missouri | Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding |
| Kansas | Severe Winter Storms |
| Indiana | Severe Storms and Flooding |
| Nebraska | Severe Winter Storm |
| Nevada | Severe Winter Storms and Flooding |
| Iowa | Severe Winter Storm |
Were mistakes made? Yes. The worst mistake seems have been the failure to use the city's buses to evacuate the people despite the most repeated and emphatic warnings ever in advance of a disaster. Second would be sensational reporting of the press, which seriously hampered the relief efforts, most notably of the Red Cross. The worst by FEMA seems to be the failure to have interoperable communication systems.79
One cannot read the accounts above and conclude that our elected officials at the federal level did not care what happened in New Orleans.
If anyone wants to understand how some in the press think about the way the world works, consider the following quote from author and professor, Douglas Brinkley, son of journalist David Brinkley, in his book The Great Deluge, about Katrina:
Around nightfall Governor Blanco was in a helicopter flying over the Louisiana devastation. She refused to let a couple of pool reporters come with her. Her lack of media savvy proved to be a serious Achilles heel. Only 'lifesaving people can go out,' she scolded the press. That was her prerogative. It was also the media's prerogative to stick a knife so deep in her back that even Karl Rove winced.
If you find the account of events in this chapter to be at odds with what you have heard in the press about the response to Katrina, and if you admire people who would rather do something than just stand by idly and watch by while the press "sticks a knife in" the back of others with whom they have a bone to pick--including that of the U.S. president--please recommend this book broadly. Spreading truth and setting the record straight about your country is worth a few minutes of your time.
What is FEMA?
According to their own literature, the mission of the Federal Emergency Management Agency is to reduce loss of life and property and protect the nation from all major hazards--including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters--by leading and supporting the nation in a risk-based, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation.
The agency is staffed by 2,600 full-time employees in Washington D.C. and at area offices around the country. The real front line for response however, is the nearly 4,000 standby disaster assistance employees and volunteers who are available for rapid deployment whenever a disaster strikes. FEMA doesn't do the heavy lifting, but works in partnership with more than 60 state and local emergency centers, 27 federal agencies, the American Red Cross, and many other organizations.
There have been over 1,700 presidentially-declared disasters in the United States since 1953. Each one represents an event that was perceived to be too destructive for state and local governments to manage without federal assistance. Many of these disasters force residents out of their homes. Residents who choose to remain face the prospect of going days without water, electricity, or energy to cook food or heat their homes, as well as the prospect of contamination and serious injury without the benefit of first aid or appropriate medical care. When individuals in the path of a major storm elect to "ride it out," they are literally taking their lives in their own hands.
Since 1990, FEMA has responded to more than 900 disasters and regional emergencies, including more than 440 since the year 2000. There were 47 Declared Disasters in the year 2005 besides Hurricane Katrina, and another 52 the following year. Every one of these emergencies is a human tragedy, which immediately mobilizes a network of national relief agencies, along with compassionate outreach and aid from dozens of public and private organizations.
Charles Taylor and Dan Miller, "Gulf Coast Still Recovering Six Months After Katrina," National Association of Counties, Mar. 10, 2006. [http://www.naco.org/ Douglas Brinkley, The Great Deluge: Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans, and the Mississippi Gulf Coast. New York: Morrow, 2006. 416. Brinkley, 229. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration website http://www.srh.noaa.gov/data/ To understand the lengths that authors of one-sided books about Katrina, all of which were bent on pinning the majority of blame for anything that went wrong during Katrina on FEMA and the Bush administration, here are a few illustrative anecdotes, One claimed that the buses might not have started. To point out the obvious, this was the city's official school bus transportation system. If they worked well enough to take children to school five days a week, one would think they would work just as well in an evacuation. Other criticisms of FEMA included the charge that they hadn't developed a detailed evacuation plan. How hard could that have been? "You're in charge of getting drivers. You're in charge of identifying fifteen pick-up points on a map. You're in charge of making copies of the maps. You're in charge of making signs and placing them around the city." Fortunately, local Wildlife and Fisheries oficers didn't wait for the city or anyone else to come up with a plan. They simply reacted. Thevenot, Brian; Russell, Gordon. "Reports of anarchy at Superdome overstated." Seattle Times. September 26, 2005. The Great Deluge, by Douglas Brinkley Bipartisan report on Katrina
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