The angrier you are about the war in Iraq, the more this chapter is for you. Though we harbor no illusions that the facts presented here will change opinions about the war's worthiness, we hope to diminish the extreme anger which is usually rooted in false or incomplete information. Political and media pressure has intensified the war of words over the past four years almost as much as the war on the ground and tempers run high on this issue. We believe that more knowledge can provide some measure of relief and a sense that the system is not actually as broken as those around the world have been led to believe.
Stabilizing Iraq's government, law enforcement, military, and civilian infrastructure so that U.S. forces can leave with confidence is obviously the main focus now. But eliminating false perceptions about the war is important as well. If the shallow view of the world held by the most cynical people were accurate, fears about a global superpower run amok as a result of failed checks and balances would be justified. We think more complete information reveals that this fear is unfounded. If this chapter helps to cause some readers to reconsider their cynicism and hate, and to restore some faith in the American process, it will have served its purpose.
Conventional Wisdom
The U.S. is at war in Iraq because Bush and Cheney lied. False claims about WMD got us into an unwinnable quagmire that was really about oil.
Facts
Let's first keep in mind that the U.S. was already at war in Iraq prior to the invasion, a fact amazingly few Americans seem to remember. The U.S. and U.K. flew 280,000 sorties and dropped over 1,650 bombs on 385 Iraqi military sites during the Clinton administration.25 Just two days before 9/11, U.S. fighter aircraft were firing at military targets and being fired upon in the skies above Iraq. Six Iraqi casualties were inflicted on that day.26 In the early 1990's, well after the end of the first gulf war, U.S. troops engaged Iraqi government troops--within Iraq--and pushed them back from Iraq's northern mountains to prevent the slaughter of thousands of Kurds.27
We should also not forget that "regime change" in Iraq became a stated goal of United States foreign policy when the "Iraq Liberation Act" was signed into law by Bill Clinton in January, 1998. The act directed that:
"It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime."
In the end, Saddam Hussein's government was removed because it failed to comply with (a) the treaty that ended the First Gulf War in 1990, and then (b) the demands of eighteen U.N. Security Council resolutions.28 One can not understand the case made for war and the related widely-publicized intelligence failures without some knowledge of the events that took place and the actions taken by the United Nations after the First Gulf War.
Working backward, the last U.N. Security Council resolution prior to invasion, Resolution 1441, was passed unanimously by all fifteen member nations, including France, Germany, Russia, and China, as well as Arab countries such as Syria. This was described at the time as the "final ultimatum" demanding that Iraq comply with the international mandates or face serious consequences.
The terms of the resolution declared this as "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations." Saddam Hussein understood the potential repercussions but did not comply. He thumbed his nose at the world community, and most of the delegates on the Security Council believed the time had come for "serious consequences." 29
By that time the most severe of sanctions had already been applied to Iraq. There's no doubt they were causing serious hardships for Iraqis, but the Hussein regime refused to cooperate. Prior to the next U.N. vote--to actually commit to war under the U.N. banner--France and Russia signaled that they would not vote to invade. The reader can judge, after the facts are provided in Chapter 11, whether the U.N.'s Oil-for-Food scandal played a role in that decision. However, the U.S. and 48 other countries agreed that the time had come for action.
Here are the important sections from Resolution 1441, passed November 8, 2002, four and a half months prior to the coalition invasion of Iraq:
The United Nations Security CouncilActing under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations:
1. Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq's failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991) ...
3. Decides that, in order to begin to comply with its disarmament obligations, in addition to submitting the required biannual declarations, the Government of Iraq shall provide to UNMOVIC [United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission], the IAEA, and the Council, not later than 30 days from the date of this resolution, a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles and dispersal systems designed for use on aircraft, including any holdings and precise locations of such weapons, components, sub-components, stocks of agents, and related material and equipment, the locations and work of its research, development and production facilities, as well as all other chemical, biological, and nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to weapon production or material30
Saddam Hussein's government did not comply with this United Nations ultimatum. Instead, the Iraqi ambassador provided a 1,200 page document in December 2002 that simply repeated previous incomplete declarations. U.N. weapons inspectors concluded that Iraq failed to account for substantial chemical and biological stockpiles which UNMOVIC had confirmed as existing as late as 1998.
In March of 2002, the chairman of the independent WMD Commission, Hans Blix, said that, "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance--not even today--of the disarmament, which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace." Blix reported further that the Iraqi regime had allegedly misplaced 1,000 tons of VX nerve agent--one of the most toxic chemical agents ever developed.31 Subsequent reports showed that an astonishing array of chemical and biological components, as well as armed munitions and SCUD missiles, had simply vanished and remained "unaccounted for."
There had never been any question that Saddam had WMD. He had used them repeatedly in the past, killing more than 5,000 Kurds in the brutal massacre at Halabja in 1988, and at least 182,000 murdered at Anfal the same year. Dozens of stories have been published in books and magazines detailing Iraq's use of these weapons.32 There are videos on the Internet with heartrending pictures and testimony of how Saddam's thugs massacred innocent civilians with poisonous gasses.33 You can also find videos of Saddam's opponents being thrown off the tops of buildings.
After the fall of Baghdad in 2003, more than 275 mass graves were discovered, each containing from fifty to several thousand bodies. Remains uncovered from those sites showed that many had been victims of chemical or biological weapons. Yet, when the search for WMD began in earnest at the end of the war, Saddam's stockpiles were nowhere to be found.
Key Terms
First Gulf War--The world was shocked when, on August 2, 1990, Iraqi tanks, aircraft, and infantry, on orders from Saddam Hussein, invaded and brutalized the tiny nation of Kuwait. Following the invasion, the U.N. Security Council passed 12 resolutions condemning the assault and giving Iraq until January 15, 1991 to withdraw. When Saddam defiantly refused, a 30-nation coalition led by the U.S. entered the region to expel Iraq's forces, destroying most of that country's military with high-precision weapons delivered by aircraft, missiles, and rockets.34 Television coverage of Operation Desert Storm gave the world an unprecedented view of the aerial war in real time.
The ground war, which began February 23, lasted exactly 100 hours. The rape and devastation Saddam's military had perpetrated on their Arab neighbors was tragic. Thousands of civilians were dead or gravely injured, the Kuwaiti countryside was littered with land mines, and more than 700 oil wells had been deliberately set ablaze on Saddam's orders, massively destroying animal and plant life in the region. Kuwaiti citizens praised their deliverers, but the stories of massacres and atrocities were chilling. The U S. Corps of Engineers and foreign contractors actively assisted in the reconstruction of Kuwait, the cost of which, according to Kuwaiti sources, would top $700 billion.
IAEA--The International Atomic Energy Agency is a United Nations commission headquartered in Vienna. The IAEA sets standards for acquisition and use of nuclear materials and conducts inspections to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear power and safeguard public health. The agency administers the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which requires international cooperation and a system for monitoring energy development plans. IAEA inspectors are authorized to monitor transport of weapons-grade nuclear fuel to ensure that none is diverted for military use.
UNMOVIC--The United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission was created in December 1999 by U.N. Resolution 1284. UNMOVIC, the successor of the U.N. Special Commission, UNSCOM, was authorized to verify destruction of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons, and missiles with a range of more than 150 kilometers. Under order from Saddam, Iraqi scientists and engineers successfully hid munitions and other WMD from inspectors, which ultimately became the real reason for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. UNMOVIC inspectors left Iraq in March 2003, but the commission continued to operate outside the country with a roster of more than 300 experts in weapons detection. The commission's mandate was eventually terminated in June 2007 by Security Council Resolution 1762.
WMD--Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are those which can kill large numbers of humans and cause large-scale damage to buildings and infrastructure. The most commons types are nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, but WMD may also include other types of non-conventional weapons. In military shorthand, the term ABC refers to atomic, biological, and chemical weapons; NBC refers to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and CBRN refers to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons.
Oil-for-Food Program--Under the UN sanctions imposed during the early-nineties, the international community agreed not to buy oil from Iraq until the country complied with U.N. resolution requirements. The Oil-for-Food program was established in April 1995 by Security Council Resolution 986. The purpose was to allow Iraq to sell oil to bona fide traders in exchange for food and other humanitarian necessities, to soften the impact of U.N. sanctions on Iraqi citizens. Between 1997 and 2002, until revelations of the scope of Saddam's double-dealing erupted in a major scandal, Iraq sold more than $67 billion in oil and issued $38 billion in letters of credit to purchase goods and commodities.35
Much of that revenue, unfortunately, ended up in Saddam's possession or was transferred to private bank accounts in Europe and the Middle East. The program ended in November 2003 with Security Council Resolution 1483, which lifted civilian sanctions on Iraq and provided for termination of the program. Oversight was then transferred to the Coalition Provisional Authority and any remaining funds were given to the Iraqi Development Fund. We offer a fuller treatment of this issue in Chapter 11.
Assessment
Many around the world are passionately opposed to the war in Iraq without even knowing what led to it. While some downplay the importance of resolution 1441--or ignore it--one can NOT understand the rationale for war without it. Since under this resolution Saddam could have avoided an impending disaster by simply telling the U.N. what had been done with his WMD, it was almost universally assumed that the reason he was not doing so was that he still had them. This universal assumption established the context for those assessing--and reporting on--Iraq's WMD capabilities over the following 4-plus months leading up to the invasion. The claims of WMD were bold because those making them had what they believed was irrefutable logic on their side.
Much has been made of the failure of the intelligence community and also the failure of the press to push back on the bold claims being made about the existence of WMD. Whether you believe that Saddam actually had WMD or not, whether or not you view resolution 1441 as an important geopolitical event or not, you must acknowledge that it affected the context importantly, paving the way for reporters and policymakers to make assertions that were unusually bold given the relative lack of complete information. Apparently it's easy to forget an old context when things get heated.
Some might think that requiring Saddam Hussein to provide evidence that he had destroyed something that had been destroyed is doubletalk. This lacks an understanding of the nature of the weapons he had. There were large confirmed stockpiles of lethal, horribly dangerous weapons, some of which were used against Iran and on Iraqi citizens. These weapons could not have been destroyed without leaving many memories of the destruction process and probably many written records. If the WMD were, in fact, destroyed, a few conversations with those responsible for their destruction or disarmament could have settled the matter and avoided the mess.
Saddam apologists have explained this by saying that he actually believed he still had WMD because his officers were afraid to tell him that the weapons had all been used, destroyed, or perhaps never existed. Those with this line of thinking typically also hold that the world leaders and press are at fault for not knowing something that Saddam didn't know himself, and something that also contradicted statements made by the CIA and intelligence agencies around the world.
Conventional Wisdom:
George Bush made the case for war solely on the WMD claim and then changed it later to spreading freedom through a democratic Iraq.
Facts
During his address to the nation one week prior to full-scale invasion of Iraq, President Bush made it clear that the U.S. was acting in concert with the wishes of the world community. In the first paragraph of that address, Mr. Bush confirmed that the emphasis had shifted from international concerns about the physical presence of WMD in Iraq to the Iraqi government's failure to report on the disposition of WMD. He says in his opening remarks:
"My fellow citizens, events in Iraq have now reached the final days of decision. For more than a decade, the United States and other nations have pursued patient and honorable efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime without war. That regime pledged to reveal and destroy all of its weapons of mass destruction as a condition for ending the Persian Gulf War in 1991.
"Since then, the world has engaged in twelve years of diplomacy. We have passed more than a dozen resolutions in the United Nations Security Council. We have sent hundreds of weapons inspectors to oversee the disarmament of Iraq.
"Our good faith has not been returned. The Iraqi regime has used diplomacy as a ploy to gain time and advantage. It has uniformly defied Security Council resolutions ... (emphasis added)."
Near the end of his remarks, the President laid out the vision for democracy:
"Unlike Saddam Hussein, we believe the Iraqi people are deserving and capable of human liberty, and when the dictator has departed, they can set an example to all the Middle East of a vital and peaceful and self-governing nation.
"The United States, with other countries, will work to advance liberty and peace in that region."
Related to the specific claim that "Bush lied," consider the following. The three most frequently cited events are:
1. George Tenet, head of the CIA, told George Bush two weeks prior to invasion that it was a "slam dunk case" that Saddam Hussein had WMD.
2. Colin Powell delivered a speech to the U.N. in February 2002 in which many claims were made that turned out to be false. Before going before the U.N. with this information, however, Powell sat face to face with George Tenet and asked for assurance that all of the facts he would present were unassailable. It turned out that many could not be proven after the invasion.
3. George W. Bush, in his January 2003 State of the Union Address, made the now famous sixteen-word claim: "The British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa." This claim was supposedly discredited by former Ambassador Joe Wilson after a trip to Niger to investigate the claim for the CIA. Later investigation by the CIA and the media showed that Wilson's report did not dispel a false rumor but actually tended to confirm that agents of Saddam Hussein had, in fact, traveled to meet with industry officials in Niger in 1999, where they undoubtedly discussed the country's only valuable export, yellowcake uranium, which is a low-grade precursor of nuclear fuel.36
Regarding points 1 and 2: George Tenet was appointed to his position as head of the CIA by Bill Clinton, not George Bush. His claims were possibly false, but the source was not the Bush administration. Regarding point 3: While the Bush administration later said the infamous sixteen words should not have been included in the State of the Union speech, it is nevertheless true that (a) the British did inform the CIA of the meeting in Niger between agents of that country's government and emissaries from Iraq; (b) the British government later issued a statement affirming that they stood by the claim; and (c) a special panel investigation by the U.S. Senate also confirmed that the sixteen-word statement was probably true.
The fact that Resolution 1441 went to a unanimous vote of its fifteen members is sufficient evidence to prove that the Bush administration was not acting alone in the belief that Iraq had WMD. Without such a belief, the resolution would have been absurd. Further, the following quotes indicate that almost all world leaders at the time believed that Iraq had WMD:
Public Statements about Saddam's WMDs
The following public officials, many of whom now claim the war in Iraq is illegitimate, made public statements during the run-up to war indicating that they believed that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons, and an active program of nuclear weapons development:
"People can quarrel with whether we should have more troops in Afghanistan or internationalize Iraq, or whatever, but it is incontestable that on the day I left office, there were unaccounted for stocks of biological and chemical weapons."
--President Bill Clinton, July, 22, 2003 37
"Iraq is a long way from [here], but what happens there matters a great deal here. For the risks that the leaders of a rogue state will use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons against us or our allies is the greatest security threat we face."
--Secretary of State Madeline Albright, Feb 18, 1998.
"Saddam Hussein has been engaged in the development of weapons of mass destruction technology which is a threat to countries in the region and he has made a mockery of the weapons inspection process."
--Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D, CA), Dec. 16, 1998.
"We know that he has stored secret supplies of biological and chemical weapons throughout his country."
--Vice President Al Gore, Sept. 23, 2002.
"I will be voting to give the President of the United States the authority to use force--if necessary--to disarm Saddam Hussein because I believe that a deadly arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in his hands is a real and grave threat to our security."
--Sen. John F. Kerry (D, MA), Oct. 9, 2002.
"In the four years since the inspectors left, intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons stock, his missile delivery capability, and his nuclear program. He has also given aid, comfort, and sanctuary to terrorists, including al-Qaeda members. It is clear, however, that if left unchecked, Saddam Hussein will continue to increase his capacity to wage biological and chemical warfare, and will keep trying to develop nuclear weapons."
--Sen. Hillary Clinton (D, NY), Oct 10, 2002
In an article, in the Wall Street Journal, former Clinton CIA director James Woolsey made several points--that Saddam possibly intentionally misled the world into thinking he still possessed WMD to keep his status as a power player in the region; that stockpiles of WMD possibly remained only to be destroyed at the last minute; that WMD-related material "probably" entered Syria months before the war; that Iraq admitted making 8,500 liters (8.5 tons) of anthrax, which if reduced to powder, could fill a dozen easily portable suitcases; and that "Iraq's ties with terrorist groups in the '90s are clear," with a decade worth of connections between Iraq and al-Qaida, "including training in poisons, gases, and explosives."
Weapons hunter David Kay, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, said that based on the pre-war intelligence, Saddam Hussein posed "a gathering, serious threat to the world." Hussein's scientists possibly misled the former dictator into believing Iraq possessed WMD, with the scientists possibly misappropriating funds. Though he also said "we were all wrong" regarding WMD in Iraq, which was widely publicized, he also said that, based on his investigation, Iraq was "far more dangerous than even we anticipated."
The bipartisan Silberman-Robb commission and Senate Intelligence Committees both scrutinized the claims made by the intelligence community and the justification for war. Both concluded that "every intelligence agency believed that Saddam's regime had weapons of mass destruction." They concluded that no one lied.38
The post invasion Duelfer report concluded the following: "Hussein maintained the capability to produce them [WMD] on short notice. There was abundant evidence of contacts between Saddam's regime and al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Given Saddam's hostility to the United States and his stonewalling of the United Nations, American leaders had every reason to believe he posed a grave threat. Removing him removed that threat."39
There was never any question that Saddam Hussein was a brutal tyrant who would stop at nothing to achieve his goals. The record of his atrocities was growing day by day. Right up to the moment coalition forces entered Iraq, the overwhelming majority of world leaders agreed that, whether by diplomacy or by force, the Iraqi dictator had to be removed. When the U.S.-led coalition invaded, in March 2003, the potential use of WMD by Iraq against our forces was listed by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and senior commanders on the ground as their "Number One Concern," and was the focus of much of the military preparations. Who will forget the images of American soldiers, covered head to toe in specialized gear and face masks in the 100-degree heat, because of the presumed risk of a chemical weapons strike by Iraqi forces?
Assessment
Lying, by any reasonable definition, involves the intent to deceive. Clearly President George Bush and General Colin Powell believed that Saddam Hussein had WMD. Their claims were based on information delivered to the administration by others who had no partisan reason to make false claims. Their military plans were based on thoughtful consideration of the context, evidence, and current events, and by the terms of U.N. Resolution 1441.
Even if some of the facts had later been shown to be incorrect, the president and his advisers did not lie. However, those who continue to repeat the "Bush lied" mantra--knowing the claim is disingenuous--actually do fit the "intent to deceive" requirement.
The premise of the U.S. and coalition invasion of Iraq was not: "We're going to invade Iraq because we know they have WMD." Rather, it was almost the opposite. The premise was: "We're going to invade because we don't know if they still have WMD, (more precisely, he has been required to tell us what he did with them and has refused) and Saddam Hussein is a tyrant who can't be trusted." We knew without a doubt that Iraq had WMD at one time, that the international weapons inspectors were being blocked by Saddam, and that Saddam's regime refused to provide the accounting of their weapons and weapons-related technologies as required by resolutions of the international community.
WMD: Where Are They Now?
Since the end of Operation Desert Storm, many credible sources have reported that there are at least three facilities in Syria currently producing chemical weapons, near the cities of Damascus, Hama, and Safira (in the Aleppo area). A senior Syrian journalist has reported that Iraq's WMD were transported to Syria prior to the U.S. invasion, and were hidden in three bunker complexes in that country.40 In addition, the testimony of a former high-ranking Iraqi Air Force officer published in this country after the U.S. invasion describes in detail how and when WMD were ferried out of Iraq and into Syria, in 56 sorties using retrofitted 747 and 727 aircraft, by civilian commercial pilots carrying out Saddam's direct orders.41
Additional support for these reports comes from former members of the Iraq Study Group (ISG) who found evidence of hidden stockpiles in Southern Iraq but were rebuffed by their superiors, who refused to authorize recovery operations. Former ISG inspector Bill Tierney, who speaks and reads Arabic fluently, made headlines in 2005 and 2006 when he translated 12 hours of conversation from audio tapes of General Staff meetings, in which Saddam and top-level aides (including Ambassador Tariq Aziz) discussed Iraq's use of chemical weapons and how the Iraqis had successfully misled U.N. weapons inspectors.
Assessment--The Courage to Act
Did the U.S. government really assemble a 30-nation coalition and commit its military and diplomatic resources to war in Iraq because Bush lied? The assumption is unreasonable, but if you believe it's true, ask yourself this question: Should the U.S. and the UK--after eighteen United Nations resolutions and twelve years of arrogant defiance by Saddam Hussein--have pushed for the "final ultimatum" requiring Iraq to provide an accounting of their WMD programs? Or should the U.N. have said, "Never mind. Let's just continue with this costly containment, punishing Iraqi civilians with sanctions and a corrupt Oil-for-Food program."? And all those previous resolutions? Should we simply have ignored them as well?
If Resolution 1441 had passed and no serious actions were taken, the U.N. Security Council might as well have shut down, having completely destroyed the credibility of the U.S., the UK, and the Security Council itself. On the other hand, by taking action the coalition ensured that when the U.N. votes similarly in the future, there will be a credible threat of action, not empty resolutions that will drag on forever with no real threat of force behind them.
A leader's job often involves making decisions with imperfect or incomplete information, and then advocating for the action required. Waiting for perfect information is almost always a recipe for disaster, and leaders worth their salt don't put things in motion by saying, "Well, we think he's dangerous, but we're not totally sure about that, and maybe we should just wait and see."
By the same token, the idea that the Iraq War was only about oil is disingenuous and ill-informed. The decision to invade Iraq was "about oil" only to the extent that it was the vast supply of oil in that country that enabled the Tyrant of Baghdad to pursue his maniacal lust for power for more than three decades.
Suzann Chapman, "The War Before the War," Air Force Magazine: Vol. 87, No. 2, Feb. 2004. [http://www.afa.org/magazine/
Hassan Hafidh, "Iraq Says Civilians Killed," The Washington Post, Sepember 11, 2001. and Julian Borger, "Democrats lash Bush 'lunacy' on missiles," The Guardian, Tuesday Sept. 11, 2001 http://www.guardian.co.uk/
Stephen Zunes, "The United States and the Kurds: A Brief History," Foreign Policy in Focus, Oct. 25, 2007. [http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/
The text of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 is available at: http://www.worldpress.org/
News of the U.N. decision to demand compliance and President Bush's final offer of a peaceful settlement to Saddam Hussein were broadcast on both sides of the Atlantic. Transcript of the President's national address, "Bush: 'Leave Iraq within 48 hours,'" CNN, Mar. 17, 2003. [http://www.cnn.com/2003/
The complete text of Resolution 1441 with precedents and documentation, is available in PDF format at the United Nations website: www.un.org/depts/unmovic/
A partial list of the WMD that went missing from Saddam's stockpiles, according to official U.N. reports, included: 3.9 tons of VX nerve agent, 6,526 aerial chemical bombs, 550 mustard gas shells, 2,062 tons of mustard precursors, 15,000 chemical munitions, 8,445 liters of Anthrax, 11,000 liters of botulinum toxin, as well as SCUD missiles and rockets armed with chemicals. Inspectors of the Iraq Study Group have suggested that these and other munitiions were transferred illegally to underground storage sites in Syria, Jordan, and Iran prior to the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003.
See for example: Brian Kraiker, "A Tyrant's Life," Newsweek, Dec. 14, 2006. [http://216.109.125.130/
u=] (accessed Apr. 9, 2008). A detailed report on the Anfal massacre can be found on the Internet: Andrew Whitley, George Black, et al., "Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds." a Special Report. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993. [http://hrw.org/reports/1993/
For those with the courage and a strong stomach, a heartrending Youtube video on the Anfal massacre and memorial is available, powerful even in Kurdish, at:http://www.youtube.com/watch?
The military coalition included Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Korea, Spain, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
"Bill Clinton on Bush uranium line: 'Everybody makes mistakes': Former president accepts explanation on
State of the Union," CNN.com, July 23, 2003. [http://www.cnn.com/2003/
U.S. News and World Report, May 19, 2008, Rethinking the Iraq Critics, by Michael Barone,
Ibid.
For those interested in more details on the production and concealment of WMD in Syria, check out these websites: http://www.2la.org/syria/wmd.
General Georges Sada, Saddam's Secrets: How an Iraqi General Defied and Survived Saddam Hussein. Nashville: Integrity, 2006. A review and discussion of the generals' testimony and the book can be found at http://www.cnsnews.com/
Mohammed Daraghmeh, "Saddam Hussein raises reward Iraq will pay for suicide bombings," The Associated Press, April 3, 2002. Trudy Rubin, "Northern Iraq is a region on edge," Knight Ridder Newspapers, Feb 25, 2003 http://www.accessmylibrary. CNN, "Iraqi Council Member: Saddam hid $40 billion," Tuesday, December 30, 2003. Con Coughlin, "Saddam's WMD hidden in Syria, says Iraq survey chief," London Daily Telegraph, Jan. 24, 2004. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ "Ex-agent says U.S. ignored WMD sites: Waged 3-year battle to conduct searches, but politics, fear got in way," WorldNetDaily.com, Aug. 5, 2006. [http://www.worldnetdaily.com/ An eye-opening interview with Mr. Tierney can be found at: Jamie Glazov, "Where the WMDs Went: An Interview with Bill Tierney," FrontPage magazine, Nov. 16, 2005. [http://www.frontpagemag.com/ Jim Geraghty, "The WMD Road to Damascus," National Review, Jan. 12, 2004. [http://article. Ira Stoll, "Saddam's WMD Moved to Syria, An Israeli Says," New York Sun, Dec. 15, 2005. [http://www2.nysun.com/ See Hayden Peake, The CIA Review of: Mahdi Obeidi and Kurt Pitzer, The Bomb in My Garden: The Secrets of Saddam's Nuclear Mastermind. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2004. [https://www.cia.gov/library/ Iraqi General Georges Sada offers the following accounting of casualties in the book, Saddam's Secrets, cited above: "Of the approximately 360,000 Iraqi soldiers on the field of battle, 28% of them (or nearly 100,000 men and boys) were killed in action, and as many as 200,000 sustained serious injuries. In addition, coalition forces captured 60,000 prisoners, and by some estimates there may have been as many as 150,000 deserters. As for casualties on the other side, 390 American soldiers, sailors, and airmen died in combat, while 458 were wounded in action. Among coalition forces, there was a total of 510 casualties. The financial cost to America was approximately $80 billion, of which coalition nations contributed $54 billion. In the end, it's clear that Saddam had underestimated the resolve of the American forces, and he completely misjudged the unity and determination of the coalition." (Saddam's Secrets, pp. 189-190). "Major Military Operation since World War II," Ask the Editors: Fact Monster. Pearson Education online. [http://www.factmonster.com/ L. Paul Bremer with Malcolm McConnell. My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006.
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